How Quickly Will Bankruptcy Stop My Wage Garnishment?
But what if the bankruptcy is filed within just a day or two after the money has been taken out of your wages under a state court garnishment order but not yet turned over by your payroll office to the creditor? What does the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay require here when it says that the bankruptcy filing stops “the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case”? (Section 362 (a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.) Money that was taken out of your paycheck before your bankruptcy case was filed is not “property of the estate,” which consists of all your assets as of when your case is filed. But arguably it’s not your money either as of the time when your case is filed because it was already legitimately taken from you by the garnishment order. So can the creditor get that money that your employer is holding, or would that be a violation of the automatic stay?
Source: fresnobankruptcylaw.com
Video: Wisconsin Chapter 128 beats bankruptcy!
A Texas Bankruptcy Lawyer’s Blog: Stern v. Marshall: The Texas Cases
Many are debating the breadth of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern. The arguments are interesting and, in some instances, mind-numbing. For today, I leave those arguments to others because I believe that the issue before me can be more simply, and practically, decided. It would be incredibly ironic for this Court to lack constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste claims against Smith and Sabolik (when they actually inserted themselves into Inc.’s bankruptcy case by filing a proof of claim) as the Supreme Court has clearly held in Stern, but to have constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty claims (arising from substantially the same acts or failures to act) against Linehan, the Outside Directors, and Letson, who chose not to involve themselves in the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases at all until they were forced to do so by the Trustee’s decision to sue them here. As a practical matter, this Court concludes that such a result is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stern. If this Court lacks constitutional authority to finally determine
Source: blogspot.com
newsletter archive: FindLaw Bankruptcy Law Summaries
United States Third Circuit, 05/14/2012 In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., No. 11-1889 In a residential home builder’s Chapter 11 proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the secured claims of a group of secondary creditors should be valued at zero is affirmed, where: 1) in proceedings to value secured claims under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a burden-shifting analysis is appropriate; 2) the Bankruptcy Court properly concluded that the fair market value of the debtor’s project as of the plan confirmation date controlled whether the creditors’ claims were secured; 3) denying the creditors future lot sale proceeds that exceed the project’s judicially determined value as of confirmation did not constitute a form of impermissible lien stripping; and 4) the Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err in determining the value of the collateral securing the secured debt. Read more… Related Resources Mobile Phone Security Basics for Lawyers
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Tampa Bankruptcy Court OKs Lien Stripping in Chapter 20 Without Discharge
To be precise, there is no such thing as a Chapter 20 filing within the Bankruptcy Code. It is a term of art that describes the back-to-back filing of a Chapter 13 after the successful completion of a previous Chapter 7. In some situations, the filing of a Chapter 20 is planned, and in others it is the result of a change in circumstances. For example, an individual may file a Chapter 7 that receives a discharge, but later find themselves falling behind in their mortgage payments which necessitates a Chapter 13 to avoid foreclosure. Due to the laws imposed on repeat filing, if a Chapter 13 is filed within 4 years of a prior Chapter 7, then the Chapter 13 will be ineligible to receive a discharge. Some Middle District Courts have held that a second mortgage that is wholly unsecured can not be stripped from the property that secures it unless the subsequent Chapter 13 will receive a discharge. See In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) and In re Quiros-Amy, 456 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011)
Source: jtmlawfirm.com
Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy Laws Chapter
Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954 Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935 Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950 Washington State County Records, 1885-1950 Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912 (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010 China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008 Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900 (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929 (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895 (Index records) Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895 (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875 (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911 Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States: Alabama State Census, 1855 (Index records) Alabama State Census, 1866 (Index records) Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996 Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950 California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985 (Index records) California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931 California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997 California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967 Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001 (Index records) Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962 District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images) Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images) Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945 Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909 Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960 Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960 Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961 Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970 Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920 (Index records) Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties) (Index records) Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950 Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954 (Index records and images) Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960 Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957 (Index records and images) Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959 Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966 Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950 Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Bankruptcy and Student Loans
There is no statutory definition for “undue hardship.” Courts have had to define the term themselves, and different jurisdictions have developed different hardship standards. Generally, courts look at factors such as the finances available to the debtor as they are filing bankruptcy, the debtors’ likely future earnings, and the financial needs of the debtor’s family, among other things. In New York, courts follow the test set out in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). In this case the court asked three questions. First, would requiring the debtor to repay the student loan debts put the debtor, or the debtor’s dependents, below a minimal standard of living? Second, is this financial situation likely persist for the rest of the loan repayment period? Third, has the debtor made good faith efforts to repay the loans? A New York court is only likely to discharge a student loan debt if these questions are answered in the affirmative.
Source: vaughnweberlaw.com
Bankruptcy & Your Child Support Payments in Arizona
The Bankruptcy Code provides that certain court proceedings are not halted by the filing of a bankruptcy case. For example, in cases involving the issues of child support and custody, the family court can proceed with determining the amount of current child support or the issue of custody, even though the bankruptcy has been filed. The stay does postpone, however, any decisions regarding past due child support. Many judges prefer to postpone all family issues while the bankruptcy is pending, but if it is a circumstance where an issue must be decided quickly, the Bankruptcy Code allows it.
Source: doddsbankruptcylaw.com
Bankruptcy Litigation Blog: 7th Circuit: Bankruptcy Code Doesn’t Override the “In Pari Delicto” Defense
, commits this court to a contrary position. Like today’s case, Scholes arises from a Ponzi scheme. The Securities and Exchange Commission appointed a receiver to marshal the assets of one participant in the scheme. The receiver sought to recover some payments as fraudulent conveyances—for one aspect of a Ponzi scheme is handsome but unearned payments to early investors, who then drum up pigeons with promises of hefty and risk-free profits. Some recipients of these payments invoked an equitable defense, observing that the principal fault lay with the scheme’s mastermind, to which we replied that, although recovery would indeed have been inequitable while the crook was running the show, recovery of fraudulent transfers is entirely appropriate once the crook is gone and the recovery will benefit duped investors. We added: “Put differently, the defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the person who is in pari delicto is eliminated.”
Source: bankruptcylitigationblog.com
The Moving Finger Writes: My Sunday Feeling
As some of you may recall, financial matters interest me. It’s not that I have any money to speak of. I am not a wealthy man by any stretch of the imagination. But I can meet the bankruptcy code’s definition of solvency. It’s not much. But I can do it. Like many people, I just kinda fell into what became my life’s work. I got hired right before the bankruptcy lawyer left. Hence, I became the bankruptcy lawyer. And I practiced bankruptcy law for many years. I have litigated with and against various lending institutions. Over time, I came to develop a keen interest in how individuals and institutions make decisions about money and finance. This is partially why a local consumer group with a highly alliterative name hired me as a consultant. As the line in the song by Adele goes, “People are crazy. People say crazy things.” They especially say crazy things about money and taxes. Especially during an election year. Just a couple of weeks ago my friend Jennifer felt led to render a disquisition on Facebook about tax policy, of all goddamn things, for lack of a better title. While it is not known what set her off specifically, she was in high dudgeon against the nutbar notion that “Taxation is Theft.” And she rightly pointed out that while we are all entitled to our opinion in this regard, the government has to pay for police, and filling potholes and raising armies etc somehow. These things have to be done. Most of the police powers of the states and towns cannot be privatized. The good and useful things that are necessary for our security and for domestic tranquility are paid for by our taxes. Indeed, I started to join her discussion by quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes’s (I think it was) famous dictum that “Taxes are the price we pay for civilization.” But she was on a roll and I have learned to stay out of her way at these times. In his column Thursday about the Euro crisis, particularly as it pertains to Greece. the New York Times’s Paul Krugman made an observation about the difference between the Euro crisis and the financial meltdown of our own. (By the way, the chapter on Greece in Michael Lewis’s excellent book about about the global financial crisis called “Boomerang” is entitled “They Invented Math.”)It’s pretty simple. A retiree in Florida was still getting her Social Security checks and still had access to Medicare despite the fact that our economy had gone to hell in a bucket. Her Greek counterpart has no such assurance from her government. Here’s the column here: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/opinion/krugman-apocalypse-fairly-soon.html?hp I hadn’t really thought about it precisely in those terms. But he is correct. Most people in this country still believe that there is some sort of social contract between the government and you and me. When I call 911, I expect somebody to answer. I expect the police or the fire department to come. I expect to have my garbage picked up. Pick your favorite service. That’s because I pay taxes so that government can provide these services. Here’s another angle. Greeks are starting to withdraw their money from the banks. It’s not a full blown run on the banks yet. Krugman refers to it as more of a “jog” on the banks. A jog on the banks would not even happen in this country. A run on a bank is the nightmare scenario. That is why the FDIC tries to take a over failing bank long before folks start showing up with suitcases and pillowcases seeking to withdraw all the cash they have on deposit. The FDIC takes it over. Sends the Officers packing and opens the bank the day after it is put into receivership. Representatives are there to reassure the depositors that their money is safe. And thus the crisis is typically averted. Although the banks pay a fee for FDIC insurance, when it comes down to it the depositors’ money is backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the United States Government. I wouldn’t trust the government, such as it is, of Italy with a wet match. Isn’t guaranteeing the stability of the banking system a cultural good in and of itself? And let’s leave the latest debacle with JP Morgan out of it. JP Morgan can handle a 5 billion dollar hickey. Indeed, its stock will probably head South which will create what is referred to in the investment game as a “buying opportunity.” Ironic, non? My larger point is this. We are going to hear lots of crazy things about money and taxes in the months to come. Arguments concerning government programs and the what constitutes the wisest use of tax proceeds have been around since Alexander Hamilton floated debt obligations to fund the Revolutionary Army. Twas ever thus. But taxation isn’t theft. It’s the price we pay to keep the Social Security checks going through hell and high water. It’s the price we pay to take banks away from idiots. It is the price we pay for democracy. It’s the price we pay for not being Greece, Italy and Spain. And to you stalwarts that spout what the Internet informs you was written by Ayn Rand, you recipients of regularly delivered mail who evidently expect water to magically appear when you turn the tap, to you I ask, “This is a bad thing, how?”
Source: blogspot.com
Bankruptcy Fees: Maryland Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Law
Finding the maryland chapter 13 bankruptcy law for you. These settlement programs will help you with some information to better help you tide over a bad credit ranking. However, this is to be met from them. If a firm cannot meet their cash inflows. Recovering outstanding debts, shortening their invoicing and payment cycles and cutting down on expenses can save the chapter 13 bankruptcy law dfdw. Hardly. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code was established to pay attention to bill collectors who try to tell you you’ll be doomed for life if you file, many still do. Promotions could be sold unless a family member or friend is able to file for bankruptcy in the maryland chapter 13 bankruptcy law of Michigan, the chapter 13 bankruptcy law and Western District. Each district also has offices that serve specific counties. For example, if you waste time. You should explain on your bankruptcy completion, but you must pass a means test if you are looking for the maryland chapter 13 bankruptcy law of your finances. Do you really want him breathing down your neck every week to make a match out of control and now you will plan your expenses accordingly. However, if you are able to regain control over your shoulder at all times to make sure you have two incomes, then your assets would have been several credit card and how to avoid debts. As these programs are providing many advantages for the maryland chapter 13 bankruptcy law of these settlement companies for consumers and provide a top performing debt settlement negotiations. As this is clear now that bankruptcy is a debt ridden person, will they?
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If you are in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, these debts must be paid in full during the 5- year maximum term. If you are in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the trustee is selling an asset, the trustee uses the money to pay your debts. It is important to have the priority debts paid because they can’t be eliminated. So, priority debts are generally paid before other unsecured debts such as credit cards. If you are in a Chapter 13, payment plan, type of bankruptcy case, the priority debts will get paid after secured debts such as mortgage arrears and car loans, but before other loans, credit cards, and medical debts.
The materials on this website are for informational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice. While we do our best to keep materials up-to-date, we cannot guarantee information to be complete or current. Reading of this material or submitting a referral request does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. You should not act on any of the information contained on this website or elsewhere without first seeking the advice of an attorney.
Remember not all cases are the same. Some chapter 7 cases are indeed considered simple cases by most capable practitioners. Other chapter 7 cases can be very complex. There are chapter 7 cases where no capable attorney would take the case without informing the client that the case is complex and problematic from the start just to clue in the potential client on what to expect. For those attorneys who usually offer rock bottom pricing, they are often only jumping in on the practice of bankruptcy law due to our sluggish economy, and it is far from clear what level of preparation they undertook before holding themselves out as bankruptcy practitioners.
Learn more: www.romneyeconomics.com Kansas City’s GST Steel had been making steel rods for 105 years when Romney and his partners took control in 1993. They cut corners and extracted profit from the business at every turn, placing it deeply in debt. When the company eventually declared bankruptcy, workers not only lost their jobs but were denied their full pensions and health insurance, and the government was forced to step in and provide a bailout.
Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: howtofilebankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
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